Logicism, Ontology, and the Epistemology of Second-Order Logic by Heck, Richard Kimberly
8Logicism, Ontology, and the
Epistemology of Second-Order
Logic
Richard Kimberly Heck
1 What Is the Problem about Second-Order Logic?
At the basis of Frege’s logicism is his logic. And, although Frege does clearly
distinguish first- from second-order quantification, at least in Grundgesetze,¹ he
never suggests that there might be any difference between them that is relevant
to the logicist project. By contrast, even though Frege does insist that the ill-fated
Basic Law V is a law of logic, he expresses reservations about its logical status
even before Russell’s discovery of the contradiction (Frege, 2013, p. vii; see Heck,
2012, pp. 32ff for discussion). Frege thus seems to have been as confident in the
logical pedigree of second-order quantification as he was in that of first-order
quantification.
Frege’s philosophical heirs have, at least for the last half-century or so, tended to
see things differently.² With his colorful accusation that higher-order logic is “set
theory in sheep’s clothing,”W. V. Quine (1970, p. 66) is no doubt the most familiar of
Frege’s opponents. But there have been others, too, whose reasons do not always
align with Quine’s. At least in the first edition of Philosophy of Logic, Quine puts a
good deal of emphasis on what he calls the “staggering existential assumptions” that
set theory makes, which he says “are cunningly hidden” in the formalism of second-
order logic (Quine, 1970, p. 68). Quine’s own concerns about second-order logic thus
seem to have been rooted in ontology: no surprise, given Quine’s obsession with
matters ontological.³
¹ Though not in Begriffsschrift. See my “Formal Arithmetic before Grundgesetze” (Heck, 2016a, §3) for
the historical details.
² It turns out to be none too obvious exactly how and why this happened. For some discussion, see
Moore (1988), Shapiro (1991, ch. 2), Eklund (1996), and Ferreirós (2001). Thanks to the many people who
responded to a question I asked about this history on the Foundations of Mathematics mailing list.
³ Curiously, the cited passage is missing from the second edition, where it is replaced by a remark to the
effect that the type restrictions inherent in second-order logic immunize it from paradox—though Quine
does still remark, at the beginning of the next section, that “The set theorist’s ontological excesses may
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But there are other reasons to regard second-order ‘logic’ as unworthy of the name,
and many of these concerns are broadly mathematical in character. We can divide
them into two groups: those concerning the logical strength of second-order logic,
and those concerning its expressive power.
To get a feel for the former, consider the first-order theory, in the language f0; Sg,
with the following axioms:
:9xð0 ¼ SxÞðS1Þ
8x8yðSx ¼ Sy ! x ¼ yÞ:ðS2Þ
This theory has a complete, axiomatizable, decidable extension (Enderton, 2001, §3.1).⁴
By contrast, if we add full second-order logic to this theory, then we get a theory that
is capable of interpreting second-order Peano arithmetic.⁵ So, whereas the first-order
theory of successor is mathematically trivial, the second-order theory of successor is
very far from it, having sufficient strength to capture an enormous part (at least) of
the theory of the reals. And the difference between these theories, note, lies solely in
what is allegedly logic.
The easiest way to see the worry about expressive power is to note that there is a
second-order formula that is valid (assuming the standard semantics) iff the
continuum hypothesis is true (Shapiro, 1991, pp. 105–6), and one can cook up
similar formulae for many other open questions in set theory. The language of
second-order logic thus seems to allow us to express hypotheses that one might
reasonably have regarded as not in the province of logic itself. Moreover, what
logically implies what, in the second-order sense, will (assuming the standard
semantics) equally depend upon how such set-theoretic questions are resolved: if
CH is true, then the axioms of arithmetic will entail certain things; if CH is false,
then they will entail other things.
Putting all this together, it is not hard to see why someone might think that, if
your interest is in the question what the logical consequences of certain assumptions
are, then second-order logic (assuming the standard semantics) is the wrong tool
for the job.⁶ The worry is simply that so much mathematics has been built into
the ‘logic’ that the ‘logical’ consequences of a given sentence end up including a
sometimes escape public notice . . . disguised as logic” (Quine 1970, 1986, p. 68). I would guess that the
change is due to Quine’s having compared comprehension to naïve abstraction just a few sentences before,
which might have misled some readers. That he had to replace (rather than augment) the remark about
“staggering existential assumptions” was presumably due to a need not to upset the pagination.
⁴ The extension in question is the result of adding all instances of induction for the language in question.
⁵ By ‘full’ second-order logic, I mean second-order logic with unrestricted comprehension and with
polyadic second-order quantifiers. The latter are essential, since the monadic second-order theory of
successor is also decidable (Büchi, 1962). Unlike in the first-order case, we do not need axioms for addition
and multiplication, since these can be defined in terms of the ancestral, as Dedekind (1902, §xi) shows.
⁶ Perhaps the best recent source for this kind of argument is Koellner’s “Strong Logics of First and
Second Order” (Koellner, 2010). Boolos (1998, pp. 302–3) registers a very similar complaint, which he
more or less attributes to Gödel, though I do not know what source he had in mind. Feferman (1999) gives
related arguments against a much stronger thesis, namely, that any notion that is permutation invariant is
logical.
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great deal that can be, and so ought to be, brought to light in the form of explicit
premises or axioms.
It is at best unclear, however, what bearing these sorts of considerations have on
logicism of any stripe, but especially Frege’s. Logicism certainly can be understood as
directed at ontological concerns, and the logicism of the positivists seems in part to
have been so motivated (Benacerraf, 1995). But Frege’s logicism and the form of neo-
Fregean logicism made popular by Crispin Wright (1983) are primarily epistemo-
logical views: they are, in the first instance, views about the source of mathematical
(at least arithmetical) knowledge. It is often emphasized that Frege needs the Basic
Laws of his system to be laws of logic. But of course Frege also needs the theorems of
the system to be laws of logic, which means that the inferences permitted in the
system must be logical, at least in the sense that they preserve logicality. And
something similar is true even when we back away from logicism strictly so called.
If logicism is understood as the claim that the truths of arithmetic are analytic, then it
is not enough to show that HP,⁷ say, is analytic and that we can, somehow or other,
derive the fundamental truths of arithmetic from HP. It needs also to be shown that,
whatever those derivations involve, they preserve analyticity—or whatever other
interesting epistemological property one thinks HP has.
If that is the right way to think of logicism, however, then we need to ask why
second-order logic’s impressive expressive power should even be relevant. It is easier
to see why its logical strength might seem relevant. Perhaps the thought is that we are
committing ourselves to a great deal when we blithely accept all the second-order
consequences of whatever we otherwise accept—much more than we can possibly
have a right to without significant epistemological cost. Perhaps a similar thought is
behind the ontologically based objections: if second-order logic makes “staggering
existential assumptions,” maybe we need to earn a right to them before we can earn a
right to all the second-order consequences of our other beliefs. But such arguments
have a worrying structure: since A somehow commits us to B, we can only have an
epistemic right to A if we independently have an epistemic right to B.
That does not mean that the ontological worries do not need to be addressed. It
does mean that we must always remember what the real issue is: the epistemological
one. Consider, for example, these remarks, from one of Bob Hale’s recent discussions
of second-order logic:
[I]f one thinks of properties—the values of bound higher-order variables—as individuated
purely extensionally, then, however much one emphasizes the supposed ontological differences
between properties and sets, one will not be able to get away from the fact that properties
behave just like sets in all logically important respects. Properties will be distinct just in case
there is an object that . . . has one property but not the other . . .Quantifying over properties
will be equivalent, in effect, to quantifying over all the subsets of the domain. But then one
might as well use set theory, for the existential assumptions will indeed be much the same.
(Hale, 2013, p. 139)
⁷ For those not yet in the know, HP says that the number of Fs is the same as the number of Gs iff there
is a one-one correspondence between the Fs and the Gs.
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Hale attributes this argument to Charles Parsons (1981, §VII), but it is clear enough
that he means to endorse it. I am not sure, however, that this really is Parsons’s
argument. I’ll return to the issue below. For the moment, let’s just discuss Hale’s
version of the argument.
The obvious question is why the mere fact that “the existential assumptions” made
by set theory and higher-order logic are “much the same” should imply that “one
might as well use set theory” as use higher-order logic. After all, the existential
assumptions made by Robinson arithmetic are exactly the same as the existential
assumptions made by first-order Peano arithmetic—they are both committed exactly
to the existence of the natural numbers—yet it would be absurd to think the two
theories do not have different epistemological presuppositions. Why shouldn’t
something similar be true of second-order logic and set theory? Might they too not
have different epistemological presuppositions?
I am far from sure, then, why so many people have regarded such ontological
concerns as central (or even relevant) to the question whether second-order ‘logic’ is
rightly so called. Here, however, is a suggestion.
What we call second-order logic really comprises two components. First, there is
an expansion of the language of first-order logic, through the introduction of second-
order variables and quantifiers that bind them. We may think of these quantifiers as
governed, minimally, by elementary logical principles corresponding to those that
govern the first-order quantifiers, namely, in the case of the universal quantifier:
. . . F . . . ‘ 8Fð . . . F . . . Þ
8Fð . . . F . . . Þ ‘ . . . G . . .
subject to the obvious restrictions, and where G is required to be a variable. If that is
all we do, however, then the result is a completely trivial extension of first-order logic.
To get any logical power, we need to add so-called comprehension axioms,⁸ which
have the form:
9F8x½Fx  ϕðxÞ:ðCOMPÞ
Here, ϕðxÞ is some formula not containing F free, and there are similar principles for
variables of other arities. We can think of each such axiom as saying that the relevant
formula ϕðxÞ defines a ‘Concept’, that being the term I shall use, as neutrally as possible,
for whatever is in the range of the second-order variables.⁹ Which comprehension
axioms we accept—which formulae we regard as defining Concepts—directly affects the
power of the resulting system.
On one end of the scale, we might accept (COMP) only for formulae that contain
no bound second-order variables (though they may contain free ones). This is known
as predicative comprehension, and it is relatively unproblematic, since it amounts
only to assuming that every first-order formula defines a Concept.¹⁰ But predicative
⁸ Equivalently, we can add substitution principles, or allow F not just to be a variable but also to be a
formula. We will return to this matter below.
⁹ I shall also speak of Concepts as ‘applying’ to objects, again trying to be as neutral as possible.
¹⁰ In fact, it can be shown that adding predicative comprehension to a given first-order theory is
equivalent (in one well-defined sense) to adding a weak theory of truth and satisfaction. Second-order
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comprehension, even though it does not just yield a trivial extension of first-order
logic, is still very weak.¹¹ The crucial point for our purposes is that predicative
comprehension is insufficient for the proof of Frege’s Theorem, that is, for the
derivation of the fundamental arithmetical truths from HP. Øystein Linnebo
(2004) has shown that predicative comprehension will not even allow us to prove
the axioms of Robinson arithmetic from HP, at least not if we use Frege’s definitions
of the basic arithmetical notions.¹²
On the other end of the scale, we can accept (COMP) unrestrictedly. This is full
comprehension, which is extremely powerful and more than adequate for the proof
of Frege’s Theorem. Full comprehension is much more problematic than predicative
comprehension, however, precisely because it is not predicative but impredicative.
Consider, for example, an instance of comprehension of this form:
9F8x½Fx  8G9Hð . . . G . . . H . . . x . . . Þ:
Here, our new concept Fξ is being defined by a formula that quantifies over all
the Concepts there are—including, therefore, the very concept Fξ that is being
defined. If we accept this sort of comprehension, then, we cannot take the second-
order domain to be comprised only of Concepts that are first-order definable, and
it would be incoherent to take it to be comprised of all those Concepts that are
second-order definable.¹³ It makes no sense to talk about what Concept a formula
like 8G9Hð . . . G . . . H . . . x . . . Þ¹⁴ defines until it has been said what is in the
range of the second-order variables: that very same formula may define different
Concepts depending upon what the second-order domain is.
The crucial question about second-order logic, so far as neo-Fregean logicism is
concerned, is thus how impredicative comprehension is to be justified. More precisely,
the question is whether our entitlement to the instances of comprehension needed
for the proof of Frege’s Theorem can be shown to be free of significant epistemo-
logical presupposition. And here is where the source of the concerns about the
relationship between second-order logic and set theory finally becomes apparent.
Why, after all, do we think that impredicative comprehension is valid? What we need
to know is that, whatever Concept the formula ϕðxÞ might define, that Concept will
be in the second-order domain. Since ϕðxÞ presumably defines some subset of the
first-order domain, it will be enough if, for every subset of the first-order domain,
there is a Concept in the second-order domain that applies to exactly its members.
quantification can then be simulated by quantification over formulae. This idea seems first to have been
explored by Parsons (1974) but has been explored in much more detail recently by Visser (2009).
¹¹ Adding predicative comprehension to a given first-order theory always produces a conservative
extension of that theory. The resulting theory is still logically stronger, however, in the sense that it is
not interpretable in the original theory (Visser, 2009).
¹² We can use other definitions to get Robinson arithmetic, as Burgess (2005) shows, but no one, I think,
would regard those definitions as anything but gerrymandered (and Burgess does not suggest otherwise).
We can also try ramifying (Heck, 2011c), or we can scale back our ambitions yet further and settle for an
even weaker, but still non-trivial, theory (Heck, 2014). So all is not lost, even if we do think that only
predicative comprehension is logical.
¹³ At least, not if the first-order domain is infinite.
¹⁴ I propose to omit a lot of quotation marks. No confusion should ensue.
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That is, it will be true if the second-order domain is (or appropriately corresponds to)
the powerset of the first-order domain. More precisely: if we take the second-order
domain to correspond to the powerset of the first-order domain, then this (i) fixes the
domain of the second-order quantifiers, (ii) thereby determines what Concept a
formula like 8G9Hð . . . G . . . H . . . x . . . Þ defines, and (iii) guarantees that this
Concept will be in the second-order domain, so that the relevant instance of
(COMP) will be true. One might reasonably suspect, then, that the validity of
impredicative comprehension rests upon the powerset axiom (and, indeed, upon
other axioms of set theory, such as separation). If so, then our entitlement to
impredicative comprehension presupposes an entitlement to the powerset axiom,
and that will have obvious epistemological consequences.
In fact, however, we can generate a problem from even weaker assumptions. In the
course of giving an argument mentioned earlier (see pp. 142–3), Parsons writes:
Consider the full second-order predicate calculus, in which we can define concepts by
quantification over all concepts. If a formula is interpreted so that the first-order variables
range over a class D of objects, then in interpreting the second-order variables we must assume
a well-defined domain of concepts applying to objects in D which, if it is not literally the
domain of all concepts over D, is comprehensive enough to be closed under quantification.
Both formally and epistemologically, this presupposition is comparable to the assumption
which gives rise to both the power and the difficulty of set theory, that the class of all subclasses
of a given class exists. (Parsons, 1981, p. 166, emphasis original)
Parsons does not explain in what way impredicative comprehension and the power-
set axiom are ‘comparable,’ but it should be clear enough that his worry is not that
second-order logic and set theory are ontologically on a par but rather that they are
epistemologically on a par. And his suggestion is not that we need to assume the
powerset axiom in order to justify impredicative comprehension. It is, rather, that
justifying impredicative comprehension is relevantly similar to justifying the power-
set axiom: it is just as hard, perhaps, or requires similar resources. The close formal
parallels between set theory and higher-order logic, to which Parsons also alludes,
only serve to reinforce this point.¹⁵
In the end, then, I do not see why it should matter whether it turns out that, for
every subset of the domain, there is a Concept that applies to exactly that set’s
members. The crucial question is not whether the second-order quantifiers do
range over the full powerset (or something similar). It is whether that assumption
needs to be used in justifying comprehension or, more weakly, whether justifying
impredicative comprehension all but amounts to justifying the powerset axiom.
I’ll return below to the question how I think impredicative comprehension should
be justified. First, I want to discuss two recent attempts, by Wright and Hale, to free
second-order logic from the “staggering existential commitments” with which Quine
attempted to saddle it. As will already be clear, I think the focus of these efforts is
¹⁵ It can be shown that nth-order arithmetic is mutually interpretable with Zermelo set theory with a
restricted version of the powerset axiom saying just that P n1(N) exists. As a special case, then: second-
order arithmetic is mutually interpretable with Zermelo set theory with just the axiom that P(N) exists.
McLarty (2013) gives a rigorous account of the details.
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misplaced. But the more important point will be that neither Wright nor Hale pays
enough attention to what I have just argued is the really important question: how
impredicative comprehension can be justified and what its epistemological presup-
positions might be.
2 Wright on ‘Neutralist’ Quantification
In “On Quantifying into Predicate Position,”¹⁶ Wright ventures to free second-order
logic of all existential commitment by articulating what he calls a ‘neutralist’ con-
ception of quantification. This view has two distinguishable parts. First, following
Agustín Rayo and Stephen Yablo (2001), Wright (2007, p. 153) suggests that we
should regard a quantified statement as committed to no sort of entity to which its
relevant instances are not already committed. This is not only a plausible thought but
arguably a Fregean one (Dummett, 1981, pp. 223ff). As Hale puts it:¹⁷
The suggestion that “Someone wrote Hamlet” carries a commmitment to the existence of
people that is absent from “Shakespeare wrote Hamlet” makes a complete mystery of existen-
tial generalization, which is surely to be understood—as its name suggests—as generalizing a
commitment, rather than introducing one. (Hale, 2015, p. 10, emphasis original)
As Hale goes on to note, however, issuing this corrective is compatible with retaining
the familiar idea that quantifiers have a “range of values.” On that view, the thought
would be that quantification allows us to speak generally about people by exploiting a
prior recognition of their existence.
It is really this latter idea that Wright means to question. He wants to suggest that
quantification into a particular position is intelligible independently of whether the
expressions that would normally occupy that position refer to anything. Rather,
Wright says:
[Q]uantification should be viewed as a device for generalization of semantic role. Given any
syntactic category of which an instance, s, can significantly occur in a context of the form
½ . . . s . . . , quantification through the place occupied by ‘s’ is to be thought of as a function
which takes us from ½ . . . s . . . , conceived purely as a content, to another content whose truth-
conditions are given as satisfied just by a certain kind (and quantity) of distribution.
(Wright 2007, p. 154, emphasis original)
The following view then becomes available: predicates do not refer to anything, but
that need not stop us from existentially quantifying into predicate positions; doing so
introduces no existential commitment not previously present; so second-order logic
has no distinctive existential commitments.
¹⁶ Hale (2014, pp. 446–7, fn. 5) complains in his critical study of my book Frege’s Theorem that I do not
discussWright’s paper. The reason is simple: although my book was published in 2011, the paper that takes
up these issues, “A Logic for Frege’s Theorem” (Heck, 2011a), was essentially completed in 2006 and was
submitted to the editors of the volume for which it was commissioned in 2007. That was before Wright’s
paper appeared.
¹⁷ Note, however, that the simple sentence “Shakespeare wrote Hamlet” is surely committed to no
person other than Shakespeare. Our use of proper names therefore commits us to no more than the
existence of the people for whom we have names. But it would be reasonable to regard the existential
quantification as having a more extensive commitment: to people, named or otherwise.
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This is a bold proposal, but, like many other bold proposals, it is difficult to believe.
What is the phrase “generalization of semantic role” supposed to mean? Consider
the following sentences:
John jumped near the bank.
John jumped off the bank.
John jumped to the bank.
Is Wright’s proposal meant to license the quantification “John jumped something the
bank”? Of course, if the quantifier here were interpreted substitutionally, it would be
perfectly legitimate, but that is not what Wright (2007, pp. 155–6) has in mind.
Surely, though, prepositions do form some sort of ‘syntactic category,’ so the problem
must be that we have no conception of what ‘semantic role’ the prepositions are
playing here. If that is right, however, then quantification does at least depend upon
there being some uniformity of ‘semantic role,’ and it seems but a short step from
there to a notion of semantic value that will provide a range for the quantifiers.¹⁸
The more important question, though, is how the meanings of quantified state-
ments are to be specified, if not in terms of a range of possible values. Wright
considers two answers.
The first—the official one—is inferentialist: we are to fix the meanings of the
quantifiers by specifying rules of inference that will constitute their meaning. Wright
suggests, unsurprisingly, that the meaning of the universal quantifier should be
fixed by the usual introduction and elimination rules. In the second-order case,
these would be:
ð8þÞ . . . ϕ . . . ‘ 8Xð . . . X . . . Þ
ð8Þ 8Xð . . . X . . . Þ ‘ . . . ϕ . . .
Here, I have written “ϕ,” where Wright has “F,” to emphasize that it is meant to be a
predicate (open formula) rather than a variable. That “ϕ” rather than “F ” appears in
(8þ) gives rise to several complications¹⁹ concerning how the usual condition, that “ϕ”
not be free in any premise, should be formulated, but I shall not pursue that issue. The
important issue concerns the appearance of “ϕ” in (8). We’ll discuss this below.
Though Wright discusses only the universal quantifier, it is easy enough to guess
what he would say about the existential quantifier. But it has become almost a
commonplace these days that “all” and “some” are just two members of a much
larger category of ‘generalized’ quantifers, which also includes such words as “most,”
“few,” and “many.”²⁰ Surely what we want here is a general theory of quantification,
not a special theory of two somewhat atypical quantifiers. But it is very unclear
¹⁸ Compare Gareth Evans (1985) on the importance of what he calls “interpretational semantics.”
¹⁹ And to one significant confusion. Wright (2007, p. 157) suggests that it is important that we allow
universal generalization even when ϕ is non-atomic, but I cannot see why that would be a good idea. One
does not usually make such an allowance in formal systems.
²⁰ The formal study of generalized quantifiers was initiated by Mostowski (1957). For a good overview
of the topic, see the article by Westerståhl (2015) in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. The classic
paper on the significance of generalized quantifiers for linguistic theory was written by Barwise and
Cooper (1981).
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how to extend the inferentialist approach to generalized quantifers. What are the
constitutive rules of inference that govern “most” and “few”? It is bad enough that
the logic of these quantifiers has no complete axiomatization. But “most” and “few”
are also context-dependent, and not just in the way “all” and “some” are. It isn’t just
that context needs to provide an implicit domain (as in “Everyone is on the bus”).
What counts as being “most” depends upon the context, and “most” is vague as well.
So it is difficult to see what, other than a prior commitment to global inferentialism—
the view that meaning is always fixed by constitutive inferences—could make one
have any confidence at all in this sort of approach.
Wright (2007, p. 161) also offers a second answer to the question how the
meanings of quantified sentences are fixed. He regards this as a mere ‘heuristic’
that supplements the inferentialist account, but I propose to consider it on its own
terms for the moment. The idea was implicit in a passage quoted earlier:
[Q]uantification through the place occupied by ‘s’ is to be thought of as a function which takes
us from ½ . . . s . . . , conceived purely as a content, to another content whose truth-conditions
are given as satisfied just by a certain kind (and quantity) of distribution of truth-values among
contents of the original kind. (Wright, 2007, p. 154)
As Wright develops this idea, we are to think of the thought expressed by some
sentence . . . s . . . as itself structured, with s contributing some relevant ‘thought-
part’ to the thought expressed by the whole. The universal quantification
8xð . . . x . . . Þ is then to be regarded as true just in case every thought of the form
. . . t . . . is true (Wright, 2007, p. 162): that is, every thought is true in which the
thought-part contributed by s is replaced by some other thought-part t of the same
type.²¹ One might think that this gives the game away, since now second-order
variables will range over the thought-parts corresponding to predicates, but Wright
(2007, pp. 162–3) argues that we need not interpret the view that way.
This account still has a difficulty with generalized quantifiers. Is “At least two Fs
are G” true just in case there are at least two thoughts of the form “t is F and t is G”
that are true? Plainly not. The fact that both of these sentences are true:
• Mark Twain is a person and wrote Huck Finn.
• Samuel Clemens is a person and wrote Huck Finn.
does not imply that “At least two people wrote Huck Finn” is true. A similar problem
will arise for “most,” “few,” and the like. It is not, of course, that this shows that the
truth-values of the quantified sentences do not depend upon “a certain kind (and
quantity) of distribution of truth-values among contents.” One could, in the meta-
language, introduce a notion of equivalence between names (or whatever expressions
are involved) and then characterize truth-conditions in terms of the resulting
equivalence classes (cf. Heck, 2011d, §8.3). But that formal maneuver, though
certainly available, only serves to highlight the fact that the fine-grained contents
expressed by the instances are actually irrelevant to truth-conditions. What is
²¹ It is not clear howWright proposes to categorize thought-types, and one might wonder if that will be
possible, absent some suitable notion of semantic value. But I’ll not pursue the point.
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relevant is only what the names have in common, namely, their reference. If so,
however, then the truth-value of “Most Fs are G” depends only upon which things are
F and which things are G, and a correct semantic theory should make that explicit, as
standard treatments do: quantifiers, to first approximation, express relations between
extensions.
The objections we have been considering so far concern Wright’s ‘neutralist’
account of quantification in general. But even if these objections could be answered,
there are other problems that arise if, as Wright intends, we want to use his account
to answer questions about the role second-order logic plays in the neo-Fregean
program. The reason is that, as Wright (2007, pp. 164–6) himself notes, his account
has a difficult time justifying even very weak comprehension axioms.
As Wright formulates his introduction and elimination rules, there is no need for
comprehension axioms. They are, in effect, built into the (8) rule, by permitting the
quantified variable in 8Xð . . . X . . . Þ to be instantiated by an arbitrary formula ϕ
(subject to the usual restrictions). But that does not make the problem go away: it just
refocuses it on the question why we should regard the relevant instances of (8) as
logically valid. Since it is easier to discuss this matter with respect to explicit
comprehension axioms, though, let’s do that.
The most obvious issue is with the impredicative case. Consider, for example, a
comprehension axiom of this sort:
9F8x½Fx  8Gð . . . G . . . x . . . Þ:
On Wright’s ‘heuristic’ account, the formula on the right is supposed to be true of a
given object x if all thought-predicates (as I shall put it) of the form . . . G . . . ξ . . . are
true of x. The comprehension axiom, however, commits us to regarding the very
thought-predicate expressed by 8Gð . . . G . . . ξ . . . Þ as being one of the thought-
predicates that can replace G in . . . G . . . ξ . . . . The issue is not so much circularity
as well-foundedness or, to borrow a term from Saul Kripke (1975), groundedness. In
general, the evaluation of 8Gð . . . G . . . Þ depends upon the truth-values of all thoughts
of the form . . . F . . . ; but the thoughts of that form will include thoughts of the form
8Gð . . . G . . . F . . . Þ. And it gets much worse, since there is no bound on how many
second-order quantifiers, and what kind, might appear in such a thought-predicate.
There is a way out: we could restrict the thoughts on whose truth and falsity the
truth-value of 8Gð . . . G . . . Þ depends to ones not involving second-order quanti-
fiers. Then there is no danger of ungroundedness. But that will justify only predica-
tive comprehension unless we can somehow argue that every impredicatively
specified formula is equivalent to a predicatively specified one, i.e. unless we can
somehow justify the infamous Axiom of Reducibility. Let me defer further discussion
of impredicativity, however, since it will arise again in connection with Hale’s rather
different account.²²
Perhaps surprisingly, Wright’s account has difficulties already with predicative
comprehension, as he himself notes (Wright, 2007, pp. 165–6). The problem arises
with respect to instances of comprehension such as:
²² See note 34 and the text to which it is attached.
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9F8xðFx  Gx ∨ x ¼ aÞ:
Here, both G and a are ‘parameters’: free variables in terms of whose values the new
Concept F is being defined. The difficulty, for Wright’s view, is that F will exist only if
there is some thought-predicate that has the described extension, and thought-
predicates do not permit parameters. Formally speaking, there needs to be a formula
in which only x is free and that has whatever extensionGx ∨ x ¼ a has, given whatever
assignments are being made to these variables. As Wright (2007, p. 166) says, even for
the case of first-order parameters, that is implausible if the first-order domain is
uncountable, and it is all the less plausible if we allow second-order parameters.²³
It is worth emphasizing how central to the neo-Fregean project comprehension
with parameters is.²⁴ One place it is required is in the proof of a strong form of
induction for the ancestral:
Q*¼ab ! 8F½Fa∧ 8x8yðQ*¼ax ∧ Fx ∧Qxy ! FyÞ ! FbðINDÞ
This is needed for the proof of the existence of successors; it is also needed for the proof
of arithmetical induction (Boolos and Heck, 2011, pp. 79–80). The crucial point is that
(IND) is stronger than what we get directly from the definition of the ancestral:
Q*¼ab df 8F½Fa∧ 8x8yðFx ∧Qxy ! FyÞ ! Fb
because of the presence of the additional conjunct Q*¼ax. The proof of the stronger
form is not difficult: we just instantiate Fξ in the definition of the ancestral with
Q*¼aξ ∧ Fξ and appeal to Q*¼aa and a weak form of transitivity for the ancestral.
But the comprehension axiom that is implicitly being used here
9G8x½Gx  Q*¼ax ∧ Fx
involves the parameters Q, F, and a. The crucial case of (IND) needed for the proof of
Frege’s Theorem is just:
P*¼0b ! 8F½F0∧8x8yðP*¼0x ∧ Fx ∧Pxy ! FyÞ ! Fb
To prove that, we only need comprehension for P*¼0x ∧ Fx, but this still uses F as a
parameter.
In fact, we already need parametric comprehension for the proof that predecession
is one-one. Here’s the argument that Pab∧Pac ! b ¼ c. Suppose Pab and Pbc. The
definition of predecession is:
Pmn df 9F9y½n ¼ Nx : Fx ∧ Fy ∧m ¼ Nx : ðFx ∧ x 6¼ yÞ:
²³ One might respond that, while we cannot have names for all of the uncountably many reals, we could
have a name for each of them. I am not sure whether Wright would agree. But if we make that move in the
first-order case, we can presumably make it in the second-order case, as well, and then it is unclear why the
neutralist conception has any ontological advantage. We’ll return to this issue below.
²⁴ Formally, it can be shown that, if we limit comprehension just to the parameter-free cases, then—or
so Harvey Friedman assures me—we cannot even prove such trivialities as: 9F8x(Fx  Gx ∨ Hx), i.e. that
the second-order domain is closed under unions.
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Since Pab, there are F and y such that b ¼ Nx : Fx and Fy and a ¼ Nx : ðFx ∧ x 6¼ yÞ;
since Pac, there are G and z such that c ¼ Nx : Gx and Gz and a ¼ Nx : ðGx∧ x 6¼ zÞ.
So Nx : ðFx ∧ x 6¼ yÞ ¼ Nx : ðGx ∧ x 6¼ zÞ, and by HP, there is some relation R
such that:
8t8u8v8wðRtu∧Rvw ! y ¼ v  u ¼ wÞðiÞ
8uðFu∧ u 6¼ y ! 9wðGw∧w 6¼ z ∧RuwÞÞðiiÞ
8wðGw∧w 6¼ z ! 9uðFu∧ u 6¼ y ∧RuwÞÞ:ðiiiÞ
The rest of the proof involves our showing that
ð*Þ ðRξζ ∧ ξ 6¼ y ∧ ζ 6¼ zÞ ∨ ðξ ¼ y ∧ ζ ¼ zÞ
correlates the Fs one-one with the Gs, i.e. that it has properties corresponding to
(i)–(iii). Then, by HP the other way, Nx : Fx ¼ Nx : Gx, and so b ¼ c.
For this argument to work, we need to know that (*) can be used to instantiate the
existential quantifier on the right-hand side of HP, i.e. that it defines a relation. The
relevant instance of comprehension thus uses three parameters: R, y, and z. And
something similar is true of the other direction of the argument.²⁵
It is tempting to suggest that, in the proof of Frege’s Theorem, we can just assume
that all the first-order parameters are natural numbers, which will all have names, in
which case the relevant instances of comprehension will be available from Wright’s
position. But, first, the formal fact that we can take all the parameters to be natural
numbers only falls out of the proof itself. One can hardly make that assumption going
in. And this is not, in any event, how the neo-Fregean view is usually understood.
Terms of the form “Nx : Fx” are supposed to make sense no matter what sort of
object the concept F applies to, not just in the mathematical case. One shudders to
think how Frege would respond to the suggestion that we need to be able to name all
the things to which F applies to be able to assign a cardinal number to that Concept
(cf. Frege, 1980, §23). But that is the assumption we thereby make if we insist that the
instances of comprehension used in the proof that predecession is one-one must be
free of parameters.
The really fundamental worry, however, is that nothing in the arguments we have
just reviewed seems in any way to depend upon whether the objects appearing as
first-order parameters are the sorts of things for which we do or even can have
names. Any account of second-order quantification that makes it seem as if that
could possibly matter is thus seriously flawed.
It would be an option, of course, to abandon the ‘heuristic’ and insist that the rules
(8þ) and (8) fix the meaning of the second-order quantifier all by themselves.
Since the latter permits impredicative instantiation, there can be no question about
its validity. But there are different ways to take this suggestion. One would be to
²⁵ An even simpler example is the proof of:
8y8zðNx : ðx ¼ yÞ ¼ Nx : ðx ¼ zÞÞ
which is Frege’s theorem 118. The proof consists in showing that ξ ¼ y∧ ζ ¼ z correlates ξ ¼ y one-one
with ζ ¼ z. For the proof to work, we need to know that ξ ¼ y∧ ζ ¼ z is a relation.
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appeal to a strong form of inferentialism that regards such questions as whether
the inference rules really do confer a determinate meaning on the quantifers as
illegitimate. I find this sort of view implausible, generally speaking, but the point is
moot. Wright (2007, p. 155) agrees that any such account must recognize the
legitmacy of some constraints on the rules posited, since some sets of rules lead to
inconsistency, and he specifically suggests that the rules must satisfy conditions of
conservativeness and harmony. But conservativeness is precisely what we do not get if
we allow impredicative instantiation: quite generally, adding full second-order logic (or
even Π11 second-order logic) to any consistent first-order theory (of reasonable expres-
sive power) yields a non-conservative extension, since the consistency of the original
theory will be provable in the expanded theory, as Tarski (1958a) famously showed.
I conclude that Wright’s ‘neutralist’ account of quantification will not serve the
needs of the neo-Fregean program.
3 Hale on Properties
Hale takes a different approach. He agrees with the usual view “that a quantified
statement is properly understood only if it is known what the possible values of its
bound variables are” (Hale, 2013, p. 154). But he argues that, if we accept a
“deflationary” conception of properties on which “every meaningful predicate stands
for a property or relation” (Hale, 2013, p. 133), then we may regard the values of
second-order variables as being properties in this sense. If so, then there is no need to
accept that the second-order domain contains a property corresponding to each
subset of the first-order domain, and the Quinean worries about second-order logic’s
“staggering existential assumptions” may be dismissed.
Before we discuss this view, we need to get clear about its essential features. Hale
tends to emphasize the intensional character of properties so individuated. For
example, in a passage quoted earlier (see p. 142), he speaks as if the crucial issue is
whether properties are “individuated purely extensionally” (Hale, 2013, p. 139). This
is in a way peculiar, given Hale’s focus on whether second-order logic is ontologically
extravagant. Intensions outstrip extensions, and one might well wonder just how many
intensions there are that correspond, say, to my singleton: there are ever so many ways
in which someone might think of me. In the end, however, the question how properties
are individuated turns out to be inessential. What really matters is whether “no more is
required for the existence of a property than the existence of the objects in its
extension” (Hale, 2013, p. 139, fn. 10). It is that sort of assumption that leads to the
conclusion that, for every subset of the domain, there is a corresponding property in
the second-order domain. Hale’s view, by contrast, is that a property exists if, but only
if, there could be some meaningful predicate that expressed it (Hale, 2013, p. 134).
As Hale notes, the view that second-order variables range over (deflationary, abun-
dant) properties need not prevent us from using set-theoretic techniques to investigate
second-order languages. It does, however, lead to a view onwhich the “possible values of
the second-order variables [are] only sets which can be viewed as the extensions of
genuine properties” (Hale, 2013, p. 145). Given how properties are being conceived,
then, this suggests that the second-order variables will range “over all and only the
definable subsets of the [first-order] domain” (Hale, 2013, p. 147, emphasis original).
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What does “definable” mean here? We are never really told. It does not mean:
definable in our language as it presently is. The view is that a property exists if there
could be some meaningful predicate of some possible language that expressed it. But
that does not help very much, absent some sense of what makes something a possible
language. To be fair, though, Hale’s presentation of this view is fairly programmatic.
He is more trying to make a certain view palatable than he is trying to establish it.
Nonetheless, or so I shall be arguing, we know enough about the notion of defin-
ability and its relation to second-order logic to be justifiably skeptical that this view,
any more than Wright’s, will serve a neo-Fregean’s purposes.
A first question is whether this view has any ontological advantages over the usual
one. In his original paper on this topic, Hale (2013, pp. 145–6, 153) claims that his
view will allow us to recognize only countably many properties, but Roy Cook (2014,
pp. 5–6) shows that this position gets Hale in a fair bit of trouble. In a more recent
paper, then, Hale is more careful:
Whilst any given finitely-based language can contain at most a countable infinity of predicates, so
that at most countably infinitely many properties are definable in that language, it does not follow
that the totality of all properties whatever . . . is at most countably infinite. (Hale, 2015, p. 6)
Even if all possible languages are finitary, that only implies that, in each language,
only countably many properties will be expressible. But maybe there are uncountably
many possible languages. If so, one might wonder whether Hale can even exclude the
possibility that the totality of all properties should contain, for each subset of the first-
order domain, a property true of exactly the members of that set. There need, after all,
only be some possible predicate in some possible language that would express such a
property, and the notion of possibility at work here is meant to be absolute meta-
physical possibility (Hale, 2013, p. 135), which is pretty lenient.
Hale (2015, p. 7) suggests that, even if we assume that the first-order domain is
countable, the utter arbitrariness of overwhelmingly most of the subsets of the first-
order domain will prevent them from being the extensions of any possible predicate.
But this is far from clear.²⁶ LetQ be some physical quantity that may, so far as physics
is concerned, take any value in the real interval ½0; 1. The value of Qmay be a length,
a probability, whatever. Now let q be its value at, say, the exact moment of the vernal
equinox in 2016²⁷ and consider the predicate: ξ is such that there is a 1 in the ξth
position of the binary decimal expansion of q. For each subset S of N, there is a real
number in ½0; 1 whose decimal expansion has a 1 in the nth place iff n 2 S.²⁸ So there
seems no reason to think that the utter arbitrariness of a set implies that it cannot be
the extension even of some actual predicate.
²⁶ Even if we do not follow Cook (2014, §3) and explore the consequences of allowing the languages
themselves to be uncountable.
²⁷ I allow myself to assume, as seems reasonable in the present context, that we can specify at least one
time sufficiently precisely that the quantity in question has some determinate value. Even if we cannot in
fact do so, it appears to be enough, for reasons to be discussed below, if it is metaphysically possible for us
to do so. Moreover, there seems no reason to suppose that our ability to specify the time precisely in any
way constrains what value Q might take at that time.
²⁸ Take 1 itself to be represented as: 0.111 . . .
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Moreover, it seems reasonable to suppose that there are examples of this form in
which q might, at the moment in question, have taken on any value in ½0; 1. So, for
any S  N, there is a possible situation in which the predicate mentioned has S as its
extension. It is unclear to me whether Hale would accept this as showing that (some
property corresponding to) S should be regarded as among the values of the second-
order variables. He speaks at one point of the second-order variables as ranging over
“possible extensions of the properties for which . . . predicates stand” (Hale, 2015,
p. 6). But this is importantly ambiguous. Is a set to be in the range of the second-
order variables if there is some possible predicate whose extension that set is, in the
actual world? Or is it sufficient if there is some possible predicate whose extension
that set would be in some other world? Given his other commitments, Hale’s view
must be the more permissive one. Surely we do not want logic to be sensitive to what
values certain physical quantities happen to assume at certain times. In particular, if
9Fð . . . F . . . Þ is a statement of second-order arithmetic, its truth-value should not
vary from one world to the next. But, for all that has so far been said, it could, if the
second-order variables were to range only over sets that are the extensions of
‘possible predicates’ in some given world.
A second question is whether the ‘possible predicates’ are allowed to have parameters.
As we saw earlier, parametric comprehension is essential to the neo-Fregean program. It
is worth re-emphasizing this point here, however, since it is relevant to Hale’s claim to
be able to prove the categoricity of second-order arithmetic, as he interprets it. The
argument goes roughly as follows. Suppose that we are given two models of second-
order PA. We then construct a certain map between them and prove that it is an
isomorphism. In the course of that proof, we need to apply induction to formulae
defined in terms of the domains of the models and the interpretations of the primitive
symbols. Obviously, it is in the nature of the proof that the domains and the interpret-
ations of the primitives are given by variables. Hence, the instances of comprehension
needed in the proof of categoricity are parametric.
It has been shown by Cook (2014, Theorem 2.6) that, if we accept certain modal
principles about the existence of possible expressions, then we can in fact recover full
comprehension from parameter-free comprehension. But if we take that route, and
restrict the second-order variables to definable subsets of the domain, then it is
unclear that the proof of categoricity now works. Usually, one means by a ‘model’
a certain set-theoretic object: the domain is a set, and the interpretation of, say, “þ”
will be some set of ordered triples satisfying existence and uniqueness conditions.
Hale’s proof of categoricity, however, cannot show that all models of second-order
PA in this sense are isomorphic, since some (components of) such models may
not be definable. We can, of course, speak instead of models that are characterized
in terms of higher-order logic (see e.g. Rayo and Uzquiano, 1999), and then the
proof will show that all models of this type are isomorphic. But one might be
forgiven for wondering whether the proof only works because it uses a restricted
notion of ‘model.’ Suppose we were to restrict ‘models’ of first-order PA to ones
in which the domain and the interpretations of the primitives were recursive. Then
it would follow from Tennenbaum’s Theorem²⁹ that first-order PA is denumerably
²⁹ Which tells us that there are no countable, recursive, non-standard models of PA.
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categorical, i.e. that it has no non-standard countable models. Restricting what counts
as a ‘model’ always makes categoricity easier to achieve—and completeness harder.
All of this is really so much skirmishing, however, since the main issue concerns
the status of impredicative comprehension.³⁰ There has never been any question
whether it is coherent to regard the second-order domain as restricted to first-order
definable subsets of the first-order domain. But that gives rise only to predicative
second-order logic. If we could say that the second-order domain comprised the
second-order definable subsets, then that would justify impredicative comprehension.
But we cannot say that. Definability is a semantic notion:³¹ to say that a formula AðxÞ
defines a subset S of the first-order domain is just to say that AðxÞ is true iff the value
assigned to x is an element of S. It is therefore incoherent, because circular, to try
simultaneously (i) to specify the second-order domain by saying that it consists of the
‘definable sets’ and also (ii) to allow second-order quantifiers to occur in the formulae
by means of which the ‘definable sets’ are being defined.
The question is thus whether there is some other notion of ‘definable subset’ that
will allow us to justify impredicative comprehension. But if we conceive of the
second-order domain as consisting only of sets definable in certain terms, how can
we be sure that we will not be able to define new sets not definable in those terms by
quantifying over all the sets that are definable in those terms? Indeed, once the
question has been put this way, one might well wonder whether some form of
Grelling’s paradox does not loom: what are we to do about the predicate “predicate
(or property) that does not correctly apply to itself”? Does it correctly apply to itself?
The notion of definability must be handled with the utmost care. It looks very
dangerous to assume that there is some totality of (extensions of) ‘possible predicates’
that is closed under quantification over that very totality.³² It is in response to this
problem that, in his work on definable sets of reals, Tarski (1958c) introduces a
distinction between meta-language and object-language and insists upon a hierarchy
of definable sets. That might suggest that there is no ‘definite totality’ of definable sets
but only an ‘indefinitely extensible’ one. But, while that sort of move might save
Hale’s account from paradox, it threatens to forfeit impredicative comprehension,
since quantification over a given class of definable sets will always be able to take us
outside that class.
I make these remarks only to illustrate how serious a problem impredicative
comprehension poses for Hale, not to show that the problem is unsolvable. Hale
(2015, pp. 13–14) is no doubt correct that, while taking the second-order domain
to comprise (or correspond to) the powerset of the first-order domain will allow us to
³⁰ Some of the foregoing may also presume what Shapiro (this volume, §2) calls the “external”
perspective. That said, if we assume the “internal” perspective, then, as Shapiro (p. 99) also notes, for
every subset of the domain, there is trivially a property true of exactly that set’s members. Hale’s view will
then need reformulating, at least.
³¹ There is a corresponding syntactic notion, known by many names: numeral-wise expressibility,
representability, and the like. So one might wonder whether that could be put to use instead. But it is a
basic result that, if T is recursively axiomatized, then every set that is representable in T is recursive. Of
course, this assumes that the logic is itself recursively axiomatized. But if it is not, then it is presumably
given semantically, and the problem noted in the text now applies.
³² This point is alsomentioned by Cook (2014, pp. 9–10, fn. 17) and Shapiro (this volume, pp. 97–8, 108).
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 21/8/2018, SPi
, ,  -  
justify impredicative comprehension, it is far from obvious that there is no other
way to do so. But Hale does not, it seems to me, really come to terms with this issue.³³
In his most recent discussion of it, he writes:
It is true that if we take as the range of the second-order variables just any proper subset of the
power set of the first-order domain, it may well fail to be closed under definition by quanti-
fication. But . . . if the range is taken to be the set of all definable subsets of the first-order
domain, definition by quantification over that range cannot take us out of it, since any subset
so defined must, by its very nature, be one of the definable subsets. (Hale, 2015, p. 14)
The difficulty, as I have already said, is that, if we allow second-order quantifiers to
appear in the formulae by which ‘definable sets’ are being defined, then we have no
satisfactory notion of ‘definable set’ until the range of those quantifiers has been estab-
lished. But if we do not allow second-order quantifiers to appear in those formulae, then
it is not obvious how we are supposed to earn a right to impredicative comprehension.
Hale does not, however, really intend these remarks to justify impredicative com-
prehension. He says in a footnote that he is “assuming that impredicative specification
is not to be ruled out on other grounds” (Hale, 2015, p. 14, fn. 25). But the question is
not whether ‘impredicative specification’ is to be ruled out on independent grounds.
The question is whether Hale is entitled to regard ‘impredicative specification’ as
legitimate, given his particular views about what the second-order domain comprises.
Hale is aware of the problem, writing in the same footnote:
[I]mpredicative specification of properties may be thought especially problematic when prop-
erties are conceived . . . as individuated by the satisfaction-conditions of possible predicates.
More specifically, it may be feared that this will lead to situations in which the satisfaction-
conditions for one first-level predicate, ϕ, depend upon or include those of another, ψ, which in
turn depend upon or include—with vicious circularity—those of ϕ? This issue is difficult, and
I cannot discuss it properly here. (Hale, 2015, p. 14, fn. 25)
But this will not do. This is the fundamental issue facing any view of the sort Hale is
defending (see also Shapiro, this volume, §4.1). One cannot just set it aside. To be
fair, Hale does say a bit more:
I think the circularity need not be vicious. It is not difficult to find examples where impredi-
cative quantification over properties in the definition of further properties or relations need
raise no such problem. Pertinent examples are the Fregean definitions of predecession . . . and
its ancestral . . .which are unproblematic—at least provided that the bound property variables
do not include within their range properties which can only be defined in terms of the
predecession relation. (Hale, 2015, pp. 14–15, fn. 25)
³³ Cook (2014, p. 2) argues that the deflationary conception of properties validates full comprehension,
but he simply ignores impredicativity, instead focusing on the problem posed by parameters. Cook’s
argument for comprehension just assumes, in the form of what he calls the Satisfaction Condition
Existence Principles, that every predicate has a satisfaction condition. If this argument is to justify
impredicative comprehension, then, Cook has to be assuming that predicates involving second-order
quantifiers have satisfaction conditions. (See the very first steps of the proofs of Theorems 2.3 and 2.6.) But
Hale’s entitlement to that claim is what I am questioning.
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But the two cases Hale mentions are precisely where the problem we are discussing
becomes most pressing.
It is worth emphasizing, first, that there is nothing impredicative about Frege’s
definitions of predecession and of the ancestral. They can perfectly well be given, and
used effectively, in predicative second-order logic (see e.g. Heck, 2011c). The issue
concerns impredicative applications of these definitions: cases in which the bound
second-order variables are instantiated by properties that are themselves defined in
terms of second-order quantification. As mentioned earlier (see p. 150), this happens
at a crucial stage in the proof of Frege’s Theorem: in the proof of induction, we need
to instantiate the universally quantified second-order variable that occurs in the
definition of the ancestral with P*¼0ξ ∧ Fξ, which must therefore express a property
in the range of that variable. Moreover, in the usual proof of the existence of
successors, we need to instantiate the same variable with Pðξ; Nx : P*¼ξxÞ, and we
need to instantiate the existentially quantified second-order variable that occurs in
the definition of predecession with a formula of the form P*¼ξa.
The problem is thus this.³⁴ Hale is certainly right that the required applications of
Frege’s definitions “are unproblematic . . . provided that the bound property variables
do not include within their range properties which can only be defined in terms of
the predecession relation” and its ancestral (my emphasis). But the proof of Frege’s
Theorem does assume that the property expresssed by P*¼0ξ is in the range of the
bound second-order variables that occur in those definitions. That is precisely why
impredicative comprehension is needed for the proof. If second-order logic, as Hale
interprets it, is to be adequate for the proof of Frege’s Theorem, then, we need to be
given a reason, besides the fact that P*¼0ξ is syntactically a predicate, to think that
the property it expresses is included in the range of the second-order variables that
appear in its definition. Hale does not give us one.
There is an obvious way out, namely, to argue that the property expressed by
P*¼0ξ can be defined otherwise than in terms of predecession and its ancestral. But it
would be utterly self-defeating for a neo-Fregean to insist that the property being a
natural number—that being what P*¼0ξ is supposed to define—is included in the
range of the second-order variables because it is definable in some other way. Which
other way? In terms of finitude? This is exactly the classical worry—originally
expressed by Bruno Kerry (1887, p. 295)—about Frege’s definition of the ancestral.³⁵
Shall we instead define the concept of natural number in terms of set theory? Or
physics? Or intuition? Any such answer will have serious epistemological conse-
quences. The whole point of defining the concept of number in terms of second-
order logic was to show thereby that it is a logical notion.
It is hard to escape a feeling that restricting the second-order domain to definable
subsets will ‘just work.’Take second-order arithmetic: isn’t it obvious that we can allow
the second-order variables to range over the subsets ofN that are definable in the very
formal language in which the theory is stated? Once again, it is not: we do not know
³⁴ The brief remarks Wright (2007, pp. 169–70) makes about impredicativity are vulnerable to the same
objections I am about to bring against Hale.
³⁵ My own discussion of Kerry’s objections (Heck, 2016b, §2), and related ones, is focused somewhat
differently from the present discussion, but it is also concerned with questions about impredicativity.
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what sets of numbers are defined by such formulae until it has been said what the
second-order variables range over; different sets will be definable given different such
specifications. In fact, it is far from obvious that there is any range that might
be specified for the second-order variables such that the sets that are definable, given
that specification, are exactly the ones so specified as being in the range of the variables.³⁶
It turns out that there is such a specification, but the construction involves some
very heavy lifting. We can begin with the first-order definable subsets of N. As said, if
we take the second-order variables to range only over these, then we get just
predicative second-order logic. But we can iterate the process. The idea of doing so
is originally due to Bertrand Russell (1908), but in his hands it leads only to ramified
type theory: even iterating the process through all the finite ordinals will not get us
even a smidgen of impredicativity. Kurt Gödel (1938) would later realize, however,
that the iteration could usefully be pushed into the transfinite. Gödel famously called
the sets so defined the ‘constructible’ sets, which together comprise the ‘constructible
universe’, nowadays known as L.
Let Ω ¼ L \​PðωÞ, that is, the set of all constructible sets of natural numbers.
Then, if we take the second-order domain to be Ω, we get a model of full second-order
arithmetic. Here’s one way to think about why. Consider the proof that the ‘standard’
model (in which the second-order domain is the ‘real’ powerset of ω) actually is a
model of second-order arithmetic. That proof can be formalized in ZF. But there is an
inner model of ZF in which V ¼ L, that is, in which every set is constructible, and the
proof works just as well there. That is: as far as ZF is concerned, PðωÞ might as well
beΩ. Moreover, the so-called “minimum β-model” of second-order arithmetic (Simp-
son, 2009, Theorem VII.5.17) satisfies the condition mentioned earlier: every set in the
second-order domain of this model is (non-parametrically) definable in the model.³⁷
Pushing forward, suppose we were to say, quite generally, that the second-order
quantifiers range over the constructible powerset of the first-order domain. That is: if
D is the first-order domain, then the second-order domain is L \​PðDÞ.³⁸ Then this
would support impredicative comprehension. Moreover, the resulting logic has
many of the same meta-logical properites that second-order logic standardly inter-
preted has, because the usual proofs of those properties go through in the inner model
of ZF in which V ¼ L: the logic is incomplete and non-compact, and Löwenheim-
Skolem fails, since second-order arithmetic is categorical. Some of these arguments,
however, depend upon the absoluteness of ω,³⁹ so it would be unwise to assume that
this logic will have all the meta-logical properties of standard second-order logic.
³⁶ It is far from obvious, that is, if we do not allow definitions with second-order parameters. It is trivial
that every such set is parametrically definable, since Fx will define S when S is the value of F.
³⁷ Thanks to John Burgess, Ali Enayat, Harvey Friedman, and Steve Simpson for responding to a
question on this topic that I posted to the Foundations of Mathematics mailing list, and for subsequent
discussion. Burgess, Enayat, and Friedman all sketched an argument somewhat different from Simpson’s,
but that argument also makes use of an inner model where V = L.
³⁸ This assumes that D is itself constructible, which seems reasonable in the present setting. But we can
make use of relative constructibility, even if D is not constructible.
³⁹ That is, the fact that we do not have different (non-isomorphic) sets playing the role of ω in different
models.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 21/8/2018, SPi
   
Indeed, if we really do think that the second-order quantifiers range only over the
constructible powerset of the first-order domain, then we ought to endorse a number
of principles as logically valid that would not normally be taken to be. For example,
we should regard second-order forms of the axiom of choice as valid, since V ¼ L
implies choice.⁴⁰ Perhaps less encouragingly, we should regard the second-order
statement corresponding to the generalized continuum hypothesis as logically
valid. This would have significant consequences for any neo-Fregean reconstruction
of real analysis, let alone of set theory.⁴¹
One thing this uncontroversially shows, at least assuming V 6¼ L, is that there are
perfectly natural models of second-order logic in which the second-order domain is
not the full powerset. But, while it is not unreasonable to regard constructibility, in
Gödel’s sense, as an idealized notion of definability, it is a very idealized notion. We
obviously need a good deal of set-theoretic machinery even to state the thesis that
the second-order domain is the constructible powerset—e.g. a robust theory of the
ordinals—so this sort of view will do little to assuage any worries that second-order
logic is “set theory in sheep’s clothing.”
Moreover, the ‘minimal β-model’ of second-order arithmetic is precisely that: the
minimal model of second-order arithmetic satisfying the conditions (i) that the
model’s numbers are isomorphic to the natural numbers and (ii) that the model
agrees with the standard model for Σ11 formulae. It can be proven (Simpson, 2009,
Theorem VII.5.17) that the minimal β-model is the one we get by iterating Gödel’s
constuction up to a certain countable ordinal γ and then taking the second-order
domain to be Lγ \​PðωÞ. This seems to me to imply that any reasonable model of
second-order arithmetic will have to contain at least Lγ \​PðωÞ, i.e. that any notion of
definability able to support full impredicative comprehension will have at least to
count everything in Lγ \​PðωÞ as being definable. This is a tall order, even though
Lγ \​PðωÞ is a countable set, since γ is, in technical parlance, way out there. Even to
get a β-model of Π11 second-order arithmetic, we must go well beyond the recursive
ordinals and so well beyond the ordinals for which we can have a system of
notations.⁴² I therefore find it difficult to see how any reasonable notion of a ‘possible
predicate’ can do what Hale wants it to do.
4 Me on Schematic Logic
In “A Logic for Frege’s Theorem,” I showed that what I there called “Arché logic” is
sufficient for the proof of Frege’s Theorem. I further argued that Arché logic has a
⁴⁰ Shapiro (this volume, §4.2) suggests, by contrast, that Hale might have difficulty endorsing choice: the
inference from 8x9yR(x, y) to 9f 8xR(x, fx) seems to imply, on Hale’s view, that there is a definable function
that does the trick. But the fact that choice follows from V = L, and is regarded as valid by intuitionists,
counsels caution here.
⁴¹ Friedman has recently shown, for example, that there are fairly simple properties that all Borel
functions provably have that, if lifted to all real-valued functions, imply :CH and so imply V 6¼ L. (The
relevant writings can be found in the archives of the Foundations ofMathematics mailing list.) For example,
if f is a Borel function, then for some x and y and any n, x 6¼ f (y + n) and y 6¼ f (x + n). But if we assume this for
all real-valued f, then :CH follows.
⁴² The relevant ordinal in the case ofΠ11 comprehension is the supremum of the first ω admissible ordinals,
and the first admissible ordinal after ω itself is ωCK1 , the first non-recursive ordinal (Simpson, 2009, p. 293).
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significantly better claim to be ‘logic’ than does full second-order logic. Hale (2015, §5)
has argued against this latter claim. More precisely, he argues that I face a dilemma:
either we interpret second-order variables as ranging over the full powerset of the first-
order domain, in which case Arché logic is no improvement on second-order logic as
standardly interpreted; or else we interpret second-order variables as ranging over
definable subsets of the first-order domain, in which case Arché logic is no improve-
ment on second-order logic as Hale interprets it.
For our purposes, we can focus simply on the treatment of the ancestral in Arché
logic.⁴³ Frege, of course, defines the ancestral in terms of second-order quantification.
But we can replace Frege’s explicit definition with a pair of rules:
ðAþÞ Fa∧ 8xðFx ∧Qxy ! FyÞ ! Fb ‘ Q*¼ab
ðAÞ Q*¼ab ‘ Fa∧8xðFx ∧Qxy ! FyÞ ! Fb:
Here, F is a free second-order variable and, in (Aþ), it is required not to be free in any
assumption on which the premise of the rule depends. The key technical point is that
we can state these rules, and reason with them, in a system that does not even permit
second-order quantification. We allow for free second-order variables, but not for
bound ones.
As I have emphasized, whereas Hale and Wright seem primarily to be concerned
with the ontology of second-order logic, my concern is primarily with its epistem-
ology. Thus I write:
[T]he crucial issue for the Neo-logicist is epistemological. The proof of Frege’s Theorem makes
heavy use of the ancestral and of inferences of the sort described by (Aþ) and (A). A Neo-
logicist must therefore show that she is entitled both to a grasp of the concept of the ancestral
and to an appreciation of the validity of (Aþ) and (A), and this entitlement must be
epistemologically innocent in the sense that it does not itself import epistemological presup-
positions that undermine the Neo-logicist project. (Heck, 2011b, p. 286, notation altered)
My strategy is to follow Frege’s example by recasting the epistemological issue as a
semantic one. What I try to show is that one can understand, and appreciate the
validity of, the mode of definition that Arché logic exploits without having any
positive conception of what the range of the second-order variables might be and
so, in particular, without regarding those variables as ranging over the full powerset.
There are two pressing questions about this proposal. The first is how formulae such
as the one that occurs as the premise of (Aþ)—formulae containing free second-order
variables—are to be understood. The second is why we should regard ourselves as
entitled to define the ancestral by stipulating the rules (Aþ) and (A). In fact, however,
if we have just those two rules, the system is very weak: too weak for the proof of Frege’s
Theorem. To get any strength, we need to liberalize (A) as follows:⁴⁴
⁴³ Full Arché logic simply generalizes this treatment of the ancestral to other notions defined in terms of
Π11 formulae.
⁴⁴ In the earlier paper, I speak instead of a rule of substitution. That is formally equivalent to liberalizing
the elimination rule, but here it is much simpler to speak of generalized rules such as ðAIÞ.
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ðAIÞ Q*¼ab ‘ ϕðaÞ∧ 8x

ϕðxÞ∧Qxy ! ϕðyÞ

! ϕðbÞ:
The difference is that, in (AI), ϕðxÞ is an arbitrary formula and not just a variable.
Thus, (AI) is impredicative: it would, for example, allow us to take ϕðxÞ to be
Q*¼ax ∧ Fx, as we need to do in the proof of induction. So what we need to show is that
we are entitled not just to the weaker rule (A) but also to the stronger one (AI).
Concerning the first question: it is implicit already in our capacity for first-order
reasoning that we should be able to reason ‘schematically’ about an arbitrary Con-
cept. Suppose, for example, that I hear some people arguing about whether Alex is
meretricious. If I have no idea what that means, that might prevent me from fully
evaluating their reasoning. But it will not prevent me from evaluating their logical
reasoning, since first-order reasoning is formal. To a significant extent, I could even
engage in such reasoning myself, using the term “meretricious” without understand-
ing it. The ability to reason schematically, using free second-order variables, is just a
short step beyond this: one simply lets F (or some nonsense term) go proxy for some
meaningful predicate or other. What I am calling ‘schematic reasoning’ thus gener-
alizes ordinary first-order reasoning by allowing us to abstract from the specific
Concepts that are under discussion. The conclusions we thereby reach are ones that
hold for any Concept: given a predicate that expresses that Concept, we can simply
replicate the reasoning that led to the schematic conclusion.
One might respond that this is really substitutional reasoning, but there is nothing
in the nature of schematic reasoning that requires whatever Concept is involved to be
expressed by some predicate of our current language; moreover, anything in the
reasoning that did depend upon such an assumption would be invalid. We are just
thinking, in an abstract way, about some Concept or other—one that is specific but
unspecified. As for what a Concept is, we can think of it simply as the sort of thing an
object may or may not ‘have’ or, to put it in the formal mode, as the sort of thing that
a predicate may express. Note that this agrees, to a significant extent, with Hale’s
conception. The difference is that I see no need to require that every Concept can be
expressed by a ‘possible predicate’, not if that restriction would have any bite. Indeed,
as I have already said, nothing in ordinary first-order reasoning, or its schematic
generalization, reflects such a restriction, and anything that did would be invalid.⁴⁵
How is such reasoning different from second-order reasoning? We shall return to
this question below, but the short answer is that it is conceptually far simpler. As
anyone who has ever taught introductory logic well knows, what makes quantifica-
tional reasoning complex is not the use of variables. That is usually familiar to
students from basic algebra. What makes quantification both difficult and powerful
is the phenomenon of scope and, more significantly, the possibility that one quantifier
may depend upon another. The lack of second-order quantifiers in schematic logic
makes such dependencies impossible to express.
⁴⁵ To clarify something (see Hale, 2015, p. 18): I do not claim that formulae of the form . . . F . . . are
always to be understood in terms of the so-called “closure interpretation,” i.e. as equivalent to
8F( . . . F . . . ). Indeed, I make it quite clear that they are not (Heck, 2011b, pp. 280–1, esp. fn. 29). Rather,
such reasoning should be understood as involving an arbitrary Concept—specific but unspecified.
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The second question was what underlies our appreciation of the validity of the
rules of inference governing the ancestral. What I would like to be able to argue is
that these rules may legitimately be treated as defining the ancestral, so that the rules
are self-justifying (Heck, 2011b, p. 286). Such a view rests upon what one might call
“local inferentialism.” It’s ‘local’ because it insists that this particular kind of defin-
ition is a legitimate way of introducing a new predicate and bestowing meaning upon
it. That claim is not supposed to fall out of a general view to the effect that content is
always bestowed by inferential role and that we can make our words mean what we
like so we can stipulate any rules we please.
But the truth is that I do not argue for this sort of thesis in the earlier paper, and
I am not going to do so here, either. My goal, now as then, is more limited: it is to
show that our entitlement to these rules, and in particular to the impredicative rule
(AI), does not depend upon any presuppositions connected with the range of the
second-order quantifiers. It emerges, rather, from the idea that schematic reasoning
is unrestrictedly general. To put it differently, the idea is to argue that, if we can earn a
right to the restricted rule
ðAÞ Q*¼ab ‘ Fa∧ 8xðFx ∧Qxy ! FyÞ ! Fb
then we can earn a further right to the unrestricted rule
ðAIÞ Q*¼ab ‘ ϕðaÞ∧ 8xϕðxÞ∧Qxy ! ϕðyÞ ! ϕðbÞ
without having to invoke the assumption that the second-order variables range over
the full powerset of the first-order domain. This is because schematic reasoning
concerns any Concept whatsoever : nothing in the nature of that reasoning depends
upon any assumption about how a given Concept can be specified, or even whether it
can be specified at all. If so, then it is just irrelevant what conceptual resources are
deployed in the predicate ϕðξÞ: if we know that Fa∧8xðFx ∧Qxy ! FyÞ ! Fb holds
no matter what Concept F might be, then it holds in the particular case of the
Concept expressed by ϕðξÞ.
That, then, is the view developed in “A Logic for Frege’s Theorem.”
Hale begins his criticism of this view by discussing my response to the objection
that our understanding of the introduction rule for the ancestral involves a conception of the
full power-set of the domain. How else, it might be asked, are we to understand
(**) Fa∧8x8yðFx ∧Qxy ! FyÞ ! Fb
as it occurs in the premise of the rule (Aþ), except as involving a tacit initial second-order
quantifer? [1] Does it not say, explicit quantifier or no, that all concepts F that are thus-and-so
are so-and-thus? [2] Doesn’t understanding that claim therefore require the disputed concep-
tion of the full power-set?
(Heck, 2011b, p. 293, example and notation changed, indices added)
Hale (2015, p. 18) accusesme of running questions (1) and (2) together when I respond:
No, it does not. A better reading would be: A concept that is thus-and-so is so-and-thus. What
understanding this claim requires is not a capacity to conceive of all concepts but simply the
capacity to conceive of a concept: to conceive of an arbitrary concept, if you like.
(Heck, 2011b, p. 293, emphasis original).
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But I do not think I was running the two questions together. These remarks were
intended only as a response to question (1): how (**) is to be read. Hale may have
been misled by the fact that I never do answer question (2). That is because my
response to question (1) was supposed to make question (2) moot, since question (2)
presupposes that the answer to question (1) was affirmative.
The objection we are discussing is motivated by the observation that, when (**)
occurs as the premise of (Aþ), the variable F is required not to be free in any
assumption on which (**) depends. So, just as in the case of Universal Generaliza-
tion, we will be able to infer Q*¼ab from (**) only if the universal closure of (**) is
true. But that does not invalidate the reading according to which (**) concerns a
specific but unspecified Concept. Requiring that F not be free in any assumption on
which (**) depends is simply a way of registering, at the formal level, the intuitive
requirement that F has to be ‘arbitrary,’ i.e. that, if the intended application of (Aþ)
is to be legitimate, we cannot have made any specific assumptions about F in
reaching (**).⁴⁶
Now, to be sure, if we want to give a proper semantic account of such languages,
we will need to make use of the notion of assigning a value to such variables, and we’ll
need to quantify over such values, too. In particular, in this case, we’ll want to say that
the inference is legitimate only if the premise is true for every assignment to F. But
the resources we need here are ones we already need to give a semantics for first-
order logic, at least when it comes to defining validity and implication:⁴⁷ we need
the idea of a predicate-letter’s having an interpretation, and we need to quantify over
the possible values. We need nothing more to define validity and implication for the
language of schematic logic. And, as Wright (2007, pp. 162–3) emphasizes in his
discussion, we need to distinguish what is required to give a semantics for such
statements from what is involved in understanding them. I am claiming that we can
understand such statements in terms of the notion of what is true of an arbitrary—
specific but unspecified—Concept and that we do not need to have even an inkling of
what it might mean to say that something is true of all Concepts.
My imaginary interlocutor, in my earlier discussion, was not satisfied with this sort
of reply. They continued to press their objection by insisting that, “if we do not have a
definite conception of the full power-set of the domain . . . then the meanings of the
predicates we introduce by schematic definition will be radically underdetermined”
(Heck, 2011b, p. 294). Making the distinction on which I’ve just insisted does not
change the fact that Q*¼ab is true just in case Fa∧8xðFx ∧Qxy ! FyÞ ! Fb is true
for every assignment to F. So the truth-conditions of Q*¼ab depend upon what
exactly the second-order domain comprises, and there will be plenty of choices,
hence the indeterminacy. My response to this version of the objection is to insist,
once again, on the unrestricted generality of our understanding of schematic reason-
ing: there is only one possible choice, since the second-order variables must include
in their range everything that they possibly could include.
⁴⁶ Wright (2007, pp. 156–7) seems to envisage a treatment on which F might actually be an ordinary
atomic predicate, but we impose a restriction to the effect that the derivation of the premise does not
depend upon which predicate it is. That would do here as well.
⁴⁷ Antonelli (2013) has argued, in fact, that an appropriately general semantics for first-order quantifiers
depends upon a notion of a second-order domain.
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Taking up my interlocutor’s cause, Hale (2015, pp. 22–3) objects that the unre-
stricted generality of schematic reasoning, even if accepted, does not by itself imply
that the second-order variables range over the full powerset. But it was never
intended to do so. To the contrary, what I am trying to argue is that we do not
need to conceive of the second-order domain as being the full powerset in order to
avoid the threatened indeterminacy. More generally, I am arguing that we can avoid
the indeterminacy even if we have no positive conception whatsoever of what the
second-order domain comprises.
There can be no disputing that axiomatic higher-order logics will always havemodels
with different second-order domains, even once we fix the first-order domain.⁴⁸ The
question iswhether this agreed fact implies that the axioms and ruleswe accept donotfix
a ‘privileged’model in terms ofwhich the actual truth-conditions are determined. If they
do not, the worry goes, then the only way that definite truth-conditions could be fixed is
if we had some positive conception of what the second-order domain was to be—one
that, of necessity, was not wholly grounded in our understanding of the axioms and
rules. Tomany, that has seemed bad. But themere fact that there aremanymodels of the
axioms and rules we accept simply does not imply that our understanding of those
axioms and rules does not fix a privileged model.
Assume for the moment that the privileged model is the one whose second-order
domain contains every subset of the first-order domain. Then the issue takes the
following specific shape. It is a mathematical fact that the axioms and rules of Arché
logic do not require the second-order domain of all of its models to be the full powerset.
My interlocutor therefore wants to conclude that the axioms and rules of Arché logic
do not require the second-order domain to be the privileged domain. I mean to be
challenging that inference. The way we understand the axioms and rules of Arché logic
might require the second-order domain to be a certain privileged domain without
requiring it to be the full powerset, even if the privileged domain is the full powerset.
The unrestricted character of our understanding of schematic reasoning forces the
privileged model to be the maximal model: one in which the domain includes
everything it could possibly include. Maybe that will ultimately imply that the
second-order domain is the full powerset. Even if so, however, there is no reason
that further fact needs to be implicit in our understanding of schematic reasoning.
One might instead regard questions about the nature of the privileged model as
significant philosophical, mathematical, and semantic questions that simply are not
resolved by our ordinary understanding of the axioms and rules of Arché logic, even
though that understanding does require the privileged domain to be maximal.
What certainly does matter is that our understanding of the axioms and rules
should support the impredicative form (AI) of the elimination rule for the ances-
tral. As we have seen, it is often assumed that the only ‘natural’ assumption that will
do the necessary work is that the second-order domain comprises the full powerset.
In response, I am arguing not only that this assumption is not required but that no
alternative positive conception of the domain is required either. It is enough that our
understanding of the rules governing the ancestral involves the assumption that the
⁴⁸ Assuming, of course, that the first-order domain is not finite, and meaning by ‘model’ anything that
validates all the axioms and rules.
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application of these rules is unrestricted: that, in particular, we accept no restriction,
in applications of (AI), to predicates definable in terms of ‘more basic’ notions.
In effect, then,what I need is only themuch less controversial half ofHale’s view: that any
definable concept will be in the domain. I have no need for, and see no reason to commit
myself to, the other half of his view: that only definable concepts are in the domain.
Hale does want to make the stronger claim, of course, because he is particularly
concerned with worries about ontological extravagance. But I have no such worries,
and I doubt that they are at the root of Quine’s objections, either. I think Quine’s
central worry is that our understanding of second-order logic is parasitic on our
understanding of set theory: even if second-order variables do not range over ‘classes,’
then our appreciation of what they do range over depends upon our understanding
that, for every subclass of the first-order domain, there is some element of the
second-order domain that corresponds to it. That is what I am trying to fight off.
And Hale and I are largely in agreement how to do it: our understanding of second-
order variables only requires us “to know what general condition something must
satisfy, if it is to be a possible value” (Hale, 2013, p. 154). And we are largely agreed,
too, what that condition is: being the sort of thing for which a predicate can stand.
Where we differ, again, is that Hale wishes to impose an additional condition: that a
Concept exists only if there could be some predicate that expressed it. I, by contrast,
find that claim unhelpful because unclear, and I simply see no reason to deny, with
Hale, that every subset of the first-order domain corresponds to something in the
range of the second-order variables.
5 Schematic Logic versus Second-Order Logic
The obvious question, at this point, is whether the sorts of resources I’ve allowedmyself
can be deployed to justify full second-order logic. In particular, one might wonder why
we cannot just follow Wright by stipulating the usual introduction and elimination
rules for the second-order quantifiers and then appeal to the unrestricted character of
our understanding of schematic reasoning to justify impredicative comprehension.
The answer is that there is an important disanalogy. In order to get the full power
of second-order logic, we need to allow parameters in the introduction and elimin-
ation rules. That is, we need to allow inferences of the form:
. . . F . . . G . . . ‘ 8Fð . . . F . . . G . . . Þ:
Without these, one will not be able to handle cases in which one quantifier is
embedded inside another. In the case of Arché logic, by contrast, such parameters
are not permitted. We could generalize the method by which the ancestral was
introduced, if we wished, to allow such definitions as:
. . . F . . . G . . . x . . . ‘ ΦyðGy; xÞ
ΦyðGy; xÞ ‘ . . . F . . . G . . . x . . .
If we do permit this sort of definition, then we get a system with the power of full
second-order logic (Heck, 2011b, pp. 292–3). But now this really is very different: G is
here being treated as an argument of the newly introduced predicate Φ, which is
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for that reason not a first-order predicate. The semantics of this sort of language
thus requires a notion of a higher-order Concept, specifically, in this case, a Concept
of mixed level under which Concept-object pairs do or do not fall. Arché logic has
no need for any such notion.
In the case of second-order logic as usually formulated, the difference is felt
elsewhere: in how the values of the second-order variables are handled. In a semantic
theory for a second-order language, we need to include values for second-order
variables in the sequences with respect to which we define satisfaction. Their values
cannot be fixed once and for all but may change as we break a formula down into its
parts. In the case of Arché logic, by contrast, we need only define truth with respect to
some fixed assignment of values to the second-order variables: in effect, we can treat
second-order variables the way predicate-letters are treated in first-order logic. And
this difference, in turn, has consequences concerning the expressive power of the two
languages.
It is well known that there are many important arithmetical facts that monadic
first-order logic will not allow us to express, for example, that there is no greatest
number. This is, in part, due to the restriction to monadic predicates: 8x9yðx < yÞ
essentially involves the relational predicate ξ < ζ . But what is really crucial is not so
much the lack of relational predicates as the inability of monadic first-order logic to
capture dependency relations between quantifiers. We can write such things as
8xðFx ! 9yðGy ∧HxÞÞ, with the existential quantifier in the scope of the universal
one. But this is logically equivalent to 8xðFx ! HxÞ∧ ½9xðFxÞ ! 9yðGyÞ. There is
thus no real dependency: the value of y does not depend upon that of x. That is what
really matters. That is what scope is really about. It would do us no good to allow
relational predicates if, say, we permitted only x to occur as a bound variable. That
would prevent one quantifier from occurring in the scope of another, so we’d still be
unable to express such dependencies and, a fortiori, be unable to capture the
difference between 8x9yðx < yÞ and 9y8xðx < yÞ.
Arché logic has exactly the same sort of limitation. There is obviously a sense in
which schematic definitions, like that of Q*¼ab, allow us to get the effect of
8Fð . . . F . . . Þ. But they will not allow us to get the effect of 8Fð . . . F . . . G . . . Þ,
because second-order parameters are not permitted. As a result, there is no way, in
Arché logic, to express something of the form 8F9Gð . . . F . . . G . . . Þ, not if the
value of G actually depends upon the value of F. For this reason, Arché logic is not
just logically weaker than full second-order logic but expressively weaker: there are
things we cannot say in the language of Arché logic that we can say in the language of
second-order logic. And that is the most important sense, it seems to me, in which
Arché logic is not just second-order logic in unfamiliar clothing. It is also why, contra
Hale (2015, §5.3), I do not think it a merely terminological question whether the
language of Arché logic is a second-order language.
6 Closing
It would be premature to draw any firm conclusions from our discussion. As we
saw in Section 3, it is not easy to find a notion of definability that will do the sort of
work Hale needs it to do. It turns out that there is such a notion, one we can
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characterize in terms of Gödel’s notion of a constructible set. But that notion is very
idealized and intimately bound to broadly set-theoretic notions: it is itself defined in
terms of iterating a certain process through the ordinals, and not just a few of them,
either. As a result, it is doubtful that taking the second-order domain to be the
constructible powerset would have any epistemological advantage over taking it to be
the full powerset.
My own response to this situation has been to scale back my ambitions. We do not
actually need full second-order logic to count as ‘logic’ for Frege’s Theorem to have
the sort of epistemological significance some of us have hoped it might. In particular,
we do not need full comprehension: it is enough if Π11 comprehension counts as
logically valid. The problem is that it is not entirely obvious how to make philosophy
out of this technical fact. One way might be to try to articulate a notion of definability
that, even if it did not support full comprehension, would at least support Π11
comprehension. I don’t necessarily say that isn’t possible.⁴⁹ But it is also possible to
approach the problem less semantically and more syntactically: don’t worry so much
about what the domain is; try instead to make it plausible that certain axioms and
rules are epistemologically innocent. That is the strategy I have been pursuing.
Whether it is the right one is, of course, a matter for continued debate.⁵⁰
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